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1 As indicated by the titles of several recent books, it has become commonplace to argue
that Pakistan is ‘in search of identity’ (Ali 2009, Jaffrelot 2002, Shaikh 2009). From the
secession  of  East  Pakistan  to  form  Bangladesh  in  1971  to  the  on-going  conflict  in
Balochistan, the contestation that the country has faced since its independence in 1947
indeed suggests that Pakistan has not reached a consensual conception of the nation. The
two-nation theory, which postulates that South-Asian Hindus and Muslims cannot live
harmoniously  in  the  same  state,  has  provided  the  main  ideological  foundation  for
Pakistani state nationalism, yet it has failed to act as a unifying concept the way it did in
the years leading up to Partition. 
2 The books under review here by Alyssa Ayres and Farhan Hanif Siddiqui are contributions
to existing scholarship on ethnic identities in Pakistan (see for instance Adeney 2007,
Ahmed 1998, Amin 1993, Baloch 1987, Harrison 1981, Khan 2005, Malik 1997). These two
works analyse movements that do not identify with Pakistani state nationalism but put
forward localized ethnic identities, arguing for cultural recognition in a more inclusive
national narrative or struggling for political autonomy. Although both books attempt to
nourish  the  debate  on  pressing  policy  issues  in  Pakistan,  they  adopt  contrasting
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approaches.  Alyssa  Ayres  draws  on  historical  analysis  and  visual  anthropology  to
investigate the counter-intuitive case of Punjab from the point of view of language policy;
although  Punjabis  constitute  the  ‘putative  ethnic  hegemon  of  the  country’  (SLS:  5),
dominating numerically the bureaucracy, the military, and the industry, in the 1980s a
language movement had ‘begun to argue for official recognition of the Punjabi language
and its cultural and literary history’ (SLS: 5). The first three chapters of the book examine,
respectively,  the  construction  of  Urdu as  a  national  symbol  by  the  proponents  of  a
separate state for Muslims, the place of Urdu in independent Pakistan, and the reactions
to the state’s endorsement of Urdu as national language. The book then turns to the case
of the Punjabiyat movement in two chapters that focus on ‘elite efforts’ and ‘popular
culture’. In chapters 6 and 7, Alyssa Ayres retraces the construction of a unitary national
narrative for Pakistan and the subsequent questioning of this narrative, which ‘open[ed]
space for the idea of a nation as a composite project’ (SLS: 148). The final two chapters
place the example of Pakistan in perspective with two comparative case studies, India and
Indonesia. The book is adapted from Ayres’ PhD dissertation in cultural history written at
the University of Chicago. Yet the author’s career extends outside academia to non-profit
organizations such as Asia Society and policy circles,  as  she has worked for the U.S.
Department of State.  Consequently,  Ayres’  work,  as is  made clear in its introduction,
‘marks an effort to engage in historiographical scholarship that can have relevance to
public policy decisions’ (SLS: 4).
3 Also  based  on  a  PhD  dissertation,  Farhan  Siddiqui’s  book  follows  a  political  science
framework—the author is  now assistant professor at  the department of  international
relations of the University of Karachi—that relies mostly on secondary sources, several
interviews and press clippings.  After an introduction which briefly defines the major
concepts in use throughout the work—the state, nationalism, and the politics of ethnicity
—Farhan Siddiqui engages in a review of the existing literature and presents the three
hypotheses that  guide his  study of  ethnic conflict:  the distinction between state and
government;  the disconnection of  nationalism with modernity;  and the need to view
ethnic groups as political actors with their own internal diversity. Chapter 3 draws an
historical account of ethnic conflict in Pakistan from 1971 to 1999 in relation to the state
and  the  government  and  discusses  the  literature  on  the  ‘identity  of  Pakistan’  and
ethnicity.  The three following chapters focus on three case studies of  the ‘politics of
ethnicity’  which,  according  to  Siddiqui,  have  to  be  distinguished  according  to  their
environment:  Sindhi  nationalism evolving in a  rural  setting,  Baloch nationalism in a
tribal milieu, and the Mohajir movement in an urban context. In each case, the author
provides an historical overview of the movement, an evaluation of the role of the state
versus that of the government in stirring or appeasing conflict, and an analysis of intra-
ethnic differences. 
 
State nationalism and cultural diversity
4 The main issue addressed by Ayres and Siddiqui is the relation of the state of Pakistan to
the cultural diversity of its population. Both authors acknowledge the state as the agent
principally  responsible  for  managing ethnic  plurality  in a  way that  maintains  peace.
According to Siddiqui, cultural difference does not become a cause for conflict until the
state  neglects  or  exploits  it:  ‘Ethnic  conflict  and violence  (...)  are  dependent  on the
political system which serves to either attenuate or intensify feelings of ethnicity’ (PEP:
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4). Siddiqui thus excludes from his study the cultural content of ethnic mobilisation and
focuses rather on the role of institutions in inflaming or alleviating ethnic resentment: 
It does not matter how many ethnic groups inhabit a single society. All that matters
is how ruling elites co-opt different ethnic groups into the political structure of the
state by empowering them with decision-making in, for example, a consociational
and/or federal political system. One may conclude then by estimating that ethnic
conflicts  are  not  generated  automatically  nor  are  they  necessarily  related  to
degrees of ethnic heterogeneity which prevail within a society. Ethnic conflict is a
function of political factors and it assumes importance as a response to the state
and its policies (PEP: 4).
5 Cultural difference becomes the basis for political mobilisation when ethnic resentment
arises  in response to the hegemonic project  of  state nationalism.  Ayres  convincingly
explains how Pakistani state nationalism came to be defined in terms of Urdu and Islam,
tracing the roots of Urdu’s association with being Muslim in South Asia to the "pre-
history" of the Hindi-Urdu controversy—the foundation of Fort William College in 1800
and  the  1837  colonial  decision  to  replace  Persian  by  vernaculars  as  administrative
languages. The scholarship of Fort William College laid the foundation for Hindi as the
language of the Hindus, to which Muslims responded with calls to ‘protect’ Urdu (SLS:
17-23). Later, as anti-colonial nationalism developed, Urdu was progressively projected as
the  language  of  Muslims  and became ‘a  bearer  of  religion’  (SLS:  20).  Among all  the
languages spoken by South Asian Muslims, it was the only one whose defence was the
object of a Muslim League resolution. ‘The year of independence, 1947, thus marked the
beginning not only of a new political formation—a homeland founded on the basis of
religion—but also of a new belief about the linguistic medium of a unitary culture in a
large  bounded territorial  homeland’  (SLS:  16).  Thus,  as  Pakistan  was  born,  the  state
project seeking to ‘produce the people as Pakistani’ (SLS: 5) was in contradiction with the
fact that the Pakistani nation had ‘been assumed to exist already’ (SLS: 6)—the common
identity markers defining that nation being Islam and Urdu, a state nationalism later
rephrased  as  the  ‘ideology  of  Pakistan’.  Yet,  as  Ayres  further  writes,  ‘Pakistan  was
created,  even  naturalized,  as  the  expression  of  a  nation,  but  that  very  nation  self-
consciously lacked a ‘national’ culture well after its founding’ (SLS: 105). Just as Pakistan’s
‘language ideology’ (SLS: 17) ignored the ‘shallowness of Urdu’s roots’ (SLS: 31-2) in the
provinces  that  constituted  Pakistan  in  1947,  the  stress  on  Islam  led  to  a  state
endorsement of a Sunni,  literate and reformist Islam disconnected from the religious
practices of the majority of the population.1 According to Ayres, ‘Islamization of national
history was an explicit focus of state planning from the very beginning’ (SLS: 14). The
association of Islam and Urdu thus produced an ‘ethnicized Islam’ (Verkaaik 2004: 20-2),
in opposition to which ‘regional groups resisting the authoritarian regime in Islamabad
legitimized the regional basis of their protest by articulating an ethnicized Islam of their
own’ (Verkaaik 2004: 21). Seeking inspiration in ‘the popular’ (Chatterjee 2006: 73), ethno-
nationalist movements found in Sufism a vast reservoir for a refashioned cultural and
religious identity, the clearest expression of which is perhaps found in the writings of the
Sindhi leader G. M. Sayed.
6 Both  Ayres  and  Siddiqui  highlight  that  Pakistan’s  ruling  elites  and  proponents  of  a
unitary conception of Pakistan as one nation sought to naturalise their political claims in
history and geography, as a solution to the lack of a ‘national culture’. Ayres shows that
‘much of the narrative groundwork for this national past had already been laid by the
various proponents of the Pakistan Movement’ (SLS: 106). She analyses the maps drawn
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by Choudhary Rahmat Ali—the Cambridge student who coined the name Pakistan in 1935
—that represent an imagined Pakistan in ‘geological times’. Constructing its narrative in
opposition to India, Pakistani historiography insisted on the separateness of the Indus
valley from the Gangetic plains, relying on a distinction between Hind and Sindh found in
the writings of Persian travellers. This distinction constitutes the basis of Aitzaz Ahsan’s
notion of an ‘Indus Identity’,  on which Siddiqui notes that it  tends to gloss over the
diversity of the region to celebrate Pakistani identity: ‘by absorbing all such folk heroes
into an overarching Indus (Pakistani) identity, [Aitzaz Ahsan] at once refutes their ‘local’
identification and indigenous existence’ (PEP: 30).2
7 Hence, the belief that Pakistan’s future and development had to rest on a unified cultural
identity led to the creation of a national narrative that stressed the unity of the (West)
Pakistani region over the centuries. As Ayres rightly points out, it was the assumption of
the nation as necessarily unitary that conflicted with the concrete existence of a diverse
population: ‘the case of Pakistan readily reveals the disjuncture between the nation-form
and its demands for a unified cultural past and present, against the lived reality of a
people yet ‘unproduced’ through the nation’ (SLS: 5). Ayres’ work raises the question of
the necessity for the country’s founders to think of Pakistan as one unified, centralized,
nation,  with  one  religion,  one  people,  one  language.  Why  did  those  who  imagined
Pakistan before 1947 and built its institutions after independence fall for the temptation
of social engineering instead of conceiving the new state in a plural form? The author
does not indicate whether an answer should be sought in the notion of a modular pattern
of nationalism (Anderson 1983), in the worldwide spread of a shared understanding of the
concept of culture (Sartori 2008), in the hegemonic nature of the state (Chatterjee 2006),
or in the roots of  the Pakistan movement (Jalal  1995).  Nonetheless she provides two
interesting examples, India and Indonesia, and compares them with the case of Pakistan.
In spite  of  its  cultural,  linguistic,  and  religious  complexity,  Indonesia  succeeded  in
making Bahasa Indonesia, a language spoken by less than 5% of its population at the time
of independence, play ‘a unifying role in (…) in knitting together the bewildering cultural
diversity of  this  archipelago’  (SLS:  171).  India,  conversely,  managed to put an end to
widespread language riots  by redrawing its  administrative map along linguistic  lines
while maintaining Hindi  and English as  national  languages.  According to the author,
these  comparisons  ‘highlight  how  language  ideology  (…)  plays  a  crucial  role  in
determining whether a national language will spread easily, without protest, and how
strongly it helps forge the national bond it is intended to create.’  (SLS:  172) In other
words, ‘we can see how the national language emerged only as the product of official
programs crafted to make national citizens learn to speak—like a state —and achieved
national acceptance only when not in conflict with the local past’ (SLS: 187). 
8 In spite of its unitary nature, Pakistani state nationalism has nevertheless fluctuated over
time, in particular during the 1970s, when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s government allowed for a
more inclusive narrative to be construed. ‘Bhutto allowed greater cultural expression to
the regions, and it was also during his administration that cultural heritage institutions
like the Lok Virsa and the Panjabi Adabi Board were founded’ (SLS:  34). This opening
incorporated local histories, which were rooted in claims to an ‘ethnicized Islam’, into a
Pakistani narrative. Pakistani official nationalism, far from being constant and uniform,
changed over time and is perhaps better understood as a result of competing discourses
in between and within institutions. Here, the distinction made by Siddiqui between state
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(military, bureaucracy) and government (elected officials) appears useful. According to
Siddiqui:
‘ethnic identity is prone to intensify in political contexts where state rules, governs
and makes policies (such as military dictatorships). Ethnic amelioration is possible
if a government exists and functions on principles of consociationalism and power-
sharing. (…) This,  however,  does not preclude the possibility of the government
acting as authoritatively as military dictatorships in denying power and privilege to
non-dominant ethnic groups’ (PEP: 27). 
9 Siddiqui concludes that ‘the history of the Pakistan polity exhibits an inexorable and
incessant  tension  between  the  elected  (government)  and  unelected  (bureaucracy–
military)  institutions of  power and authority’,  a  tension in which ‘governments have
never been completely docile before the military’ (PEP: 32). 
10 But Siddiqui’s distinction between state and government remains problematic; it does not
define what the state is exactly, what it seeks, and why it cannot deviate from its own
positions and authoritarian behaviour. Moreover, it ignores the fact that the government
abides by the rules of  the state and thus serves the state even as it  appeases ethnic
conflict by moderating the state’s (postulated) centralizing tendency. If the government
of Zulfiqar Ali  Bhutto managed to mould Pakistani nationalism into a more inclusive
narrative,  the  process  went  hand  in  hand  with  tighter  repression  of  subversive
discourses. Therefore, the crackdown on Baloch insurgents in 1973 seems best conceived
as  the  necessary  counterpart,  for  instance,  to  the  creation  of  the  Lok  Virsa  or  the
organisation  of  a  major  conference  on  Sindh’s  history  in  1975.  The  government  of
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto shifted the limits between the acceptable and the subversive, but this
strengthened the need to suppress the subversive.  The distinction between state and
government thus seems of limited heuristic value, since it neither serves as a basis for a
generalization nor entails a proper sociology of the state,  which would yield sharper
conclusions. Siddiqui’s attempt to open the ‘black box’ of the state, in line with liberal and
constructivist international relations scholarship, in fact appears to recreate monolithic
objects in the state and the government.
 
Questioning the dominant theory of nationalism
11 Both Ayres and Siddiqui find the dominant theory of nationalism (in particular, Gellner
1983 and Anderson 1983) at odds with the context of Pakistan. Alyssa Ayres questions
Benedict Anderson’s concept of print-capitalism; to her, Punjab’s low literacy rate ‘poses
clear limitations for the explanatory or catalytic value of print textual forms to engage
this large population in a common sense of national belonging’ (SLS: 72). She adds: ‘that
these three [India, Indonesia, Pakistan] independence movements, movements that
envisioned nations that had never before existed, were able to convert the masses who
did not actually read (…) suggests that the ‘meme’ of national consciousness can indeed
coalesce through oral communication, public addresses, and other forms of non-print
communication that can take place in multiple, even mixed, language forms’ (SLS: 186).
That nationalism relies on means of propagation other than print3 —which is not a novel
idea (see Chatterjee 1993: 73)—leads Ayres to turn to Punjabi cinema to show how Punjabi
popular culture tried to reverse a sense of inferiority. The film Maula Jatt and its sequels
portrayed a  strong,  brave  and violent  hero  and did  not  shy away from using crude
language,  thus ‘reclaiming a Punjabi  imaginaire in which Punjab would no longer be
viewed as submissive’ (SLS: 97).
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12 Farhan  Siddiqui’s  critique  of  Ernest  Gellner’s  theory  of  nationalism  concerns  the
relationship between industrial development and the emergence of nationalism. Treating
Gellner’s  thesis  critically  and  applying  it  to  post-colonial  societies,  one  is  bound  to
question his essentially modernist predilection which sees nationalism as emerging from
the socio-economic context  of  industrialisation.  (…)  As  the example of  ethnonational
movements in Pakistan demonstrates, feelings of nationalism can emerge in tribal and
rural socio-economic contexts as well (PEP: 11).
13 Yet Siddiqui’s categorisation of Sindh and Balochistan as, respectively, ‘rural’ and ‘tribal’
settings does not deconstruct the modern/traditional dichotomy but rather reinforces it.
His assumption that ‘rural’ and ‘tribal’ societies were unconnected to industrialisation or
modernity4 ignores the argument that the ‘underdevelopment’ of colonial societies was as
much part of the modern imperialist project as the industrialization of the home country.
The simple categorization of  Sindh and Balochistan as rural  and tribal  overlooks the
complex relations between rural and urban areas, as a result of which the changes in
urban lifestyles significantly impact rural social structures. In Sindh, migrant labourers,
students, as well as a wider range of people (men) who have had access to education,
move  far  beyond  a  hypothetical  ‘rural’  setting,  thus  connecting  villages  to  cities.
Incidentally, students and educated men with a rural background are often also highly
politicised, and at the forefront of nationalist movements. Siddiqui’s attempt to refute the
modern/traditional dichotomy misses the point: rather than asserting that nationalism
can also emerge in a rural context, what needs to be examined are the socio-economic
conditions  that  give  rise  to  ethno-national  movements,  in  particular  the  complex
relationship of between the rural and the urban out of which a frustrated middle-class
develops ethno-national demands (for analyses of socio-economic conditions of ethno-
national movements in Pakistan, see for instance Alavi 1989 and, Ahmed 1984). 
14 Siddiqui’s approach does not focus on how nations are formed, but on how they behave as
political  actors:  ‘In this sense,  then,  a study of  nationalism is (...)  about how nations
conduct and evolve relevant ideologies, discourses and movements in order to achieve
statehood or even provincial autonomy’ (PEP: 9). Siddiqui’s non-committal position leaves
to nationalists themselves the debate over who really constitutes a nation or which group
better fulfils the conditions to be one. But taking for granted that Sindh, Balochistan and
Mohajirs are already formed nations, or ethnic groups, leads him to miss an important
element: that nation-formation is a performative process. The ‘politics of ethnicity’ does
not happen once ethnicities or nations are formed, but the definition of identity markers
and boundaries is constitutive of their very existence (Barth 1969). Hence the salience of
Ernest Gellner’s famous line: ‘It is nationalism which engenders nations, not the other
way around’ (Gellner 1983: 55). 
15 Even if  one  admits  that  nationalism is  a  process  ‘taken  too  literally  to  be  political’
(Chatterjee 2006:  5),  which starts  much before political  movements emerge,  studying
‘how these politically non-dominant nations initiated their own political organisations,
movements and ideologies against an authoritarian and authoritative state structure’ (
PEP: 9) comes down to studying the constant process of national re-creation, provided one
looks at the relation between the political elite and the population at large. Siddiqui’s
study would thus have gained much by acknowledging that the ‘politics of ethnicity’ is
the  site  of  constant  self-redefinition  by  ethnic  groups,  in  which  what  is  defined  as
representative of the group’s identity implies the rejection of what then becomes the
‘other’. Thus, understanding the politics of ethnicity requires looking into the claims to
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nationhood that ethno-national groups put forward on the basis of historical revisionism
and the mobilisation of  symbolism,  a  process  certainly not  pursued uniformly by all
members of ethnic groups.
 
Intra-ethnic conflict and cultural hegemony
16 Conscious of the risk of reifying ethnic groups as homogeneous givens, both Ayres and
Siddiqui attempt to grasp internal differentiations. Siddiqui first distinguishes between
the public at large and political organisations: ‘It is not ethnic groups that are involved in
ethnic conflict; rather, it is the ethnic organization that claims to speak in the name of
the nation and is involved in conflict with the state’ (PEP:  18). Therefore, it is not, as
Siddiqui also contends, ‘ethnic groups [that] are internally stratified on the basis of the
political  choices  that  they make by allying themselves  with the state  or  standing in
opposition to it’ (PEP: 3), but the political organisations that seek to represent them. The
demarcation made by Charles Kennedy between separatist, autonomist and ‘gradualist’
parties in Sindh followed a similar logic (Kennedy 1991: 947). But as Siddiqui notes, ethnic
organisations and their leaders are subject to co-optation by the state,  moulding the
official standpoint of political organisations over time. A close study of the evolution of
the stances of various ethnic political organisations is thus necessary to understand their
relation to the state, as well as to show the conditions under which factions unite or fight
one another. But acknowledging that these organisations only claim to speak in the name
of the whole ethnic group does not inform us about how others, say persons not affiliated
with any organisation, stand in relation to such parties or understand their own identity.
17 Rather  than  focusing  on  the  attitude  of  ethnic  groups  or  their  self-designated
representatives towards the state, Alyssa Ayres relies on an elite/popular distinction to
first examine ‘elite efforts’ for Punjabi assertion—writings of a small Lahore intelligentsia
—before  turning  to  popular  culture.  Her  analysis  of  the  work  of  elite  ‘cultural
entrepreneurs’  and  of  popular  media—cartoons  and  cinema—highlights  a  Punjabi
discourse of assertion, but doesn’t does not seek to explain the relationship between the
elite conception of Punjab and what she presents as the popular representation of being
Punjabi.  Ayres  overlooks  the  cultural  hegemony  that  nationalism  imposes  on  the
population that nationalists claim to speak for—as well as the internal resistance that this
hegemony may encounter from those it excludes. For instance, one may wonder how
Siraiki speakers residing in Punjab feel regarding the Punjabiyat movement or what the
reactions  of  people  from various  strata  of  Punjabi  society  may be.  Ayres  provides  a
general  framework  to  describe  how  nationalism  creates  oppositions  according  to  a
modular pattern. ‘These divisive, ‘dichotomizing oppositions,’ in the words of Susan Gal,
can recreate themselves recursively,  in the manner of  fractals—which replicate their
forms  on  ‘ever-smaller  social  units’  (SLS:  28).  She  argues  that  the  initial  distinction
between Hindi  and Urdu,  superimposed on Hindu/Muslim identities,  replicated itself
onto  smaller  entities:  Bengal,  Sindh,  Punjab,  or  the  Seraiki  region.  ‘Replicated
dichotomisations’ (SLS: 29, 46, 48) thus determine ‘smaller’ nationalisms: in a type of mise
en abyme, Sindhi, Baluch, Pashto or Punjabi movements must define themselves against
Pakistani state nationalism, which is itself posited against Indian nationalism. 
18 These two books provide for a stimulating discussion on ethno-nationalism and state
policy towards diversity and are therefore welcome additions to the literature on ethno-
nationalism in Pakistan. Siddiqui’s work offers a coherent synthesis on three of Pakistan’s
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major ethnic movements and their relationship with the state. Alyssa Ayres brings to the
fore a little known movement and has the merit of studying new material. Yet at a time
when a small fraction of the numerous new publications on Pakistan rely on empirical
research, one may regret that neither Ayres nor Siddiqui uses observation to substantiate
her/his reflections (although it should be noted here that Alyssa Ayres’ initial fieldwork
project  was  held  up  for  security  reasons).  Siddiqui’s  work  would  have  gained  from
drawing  on  the  sociology  of  mobilisations  and  social  movements.5 This  would  have
allowed  him  to  offer  greater  insights  on  the  internal  dynamics  of  ethno-national
movements and on the lived reality of those who partake in them. It would also have
allowed  him to  pay  more  attention  to  socio-economic  conditions  or  to  the  cultural
content  of  ethno-nationalist  discourses,  factors  that  the  focus  on  the  state  and  the
government leads him to ignore. Ayres’ study could perhaps have gone beyond the elite/
popular dichotomy by examining in their social context the strategic decisions made by
cultural entrepreneurs, filmmakers or cartoonists in picturing Punjab. But in spite of my
criticisms, these works provide useful perspectives on an issue that has been the source of
violent conflict in Pakistan and on which Siddiqui concludes, with a rather pessimistic
note, that ‘although ethnonationalist movements will not cause the break-up of Pakistan
in the future, Pakistan will continue to be plagued by such movements’ (PEP: 113).
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NOTES
1. On Pakistani nationalist discourses and Islam, see Talbot (2003).
2. Apart from having written the book to which Siddiqui refers,  Aitzaz Ahsan is a renowned
lawyer who defended the cases of  former Prime Ministers Benazir  Bhutto,  Nawaz Sharif  and
Yusuf  Raza  Gilani.  He  has  been  an  active  member  of  the  Pakistan  People’s  Party  since  the
mid-1970s and served twice as minister under the two governments headed by Benazir Bhutto in
the late 1980s and mid-1990s.
3. It should be noted that the societies which, according to Anderson, developed a national model
later exported to other places, had a literacy level probably not much very different from that of
Pakistani Punjab today, or perhaps lower.
4. Siddiqui  states  that  ‘In  many  ways,  the  rise  of  nationalism  in  post-colonial  states  was
unconnected with the onset of industrialisation and capitalism.’ (PEP: 14).
5. There is a vast literature on the subject, from Mancur Olson's seminal The Logic of Collective
Action (Olson 1965) to the more recent work of Christian Davenport, Hank Johnston and Carol
Mueller  (Davenport  et  al.  2005),  including Charles  Tilly's  notions  of  contentious  politics  and
repertoire of collective action (Tilly 2006, Tilly & Tarrow 2006).
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